Zusatzmaterial:

Q4

"Take our stand for freedom."

I will begin by saving what everybody would like to ignore or forget [...] [:] The utmost he [Chamberlain] has been able to gain for Czechoslovakia and in the matters which were in dispute has been that the German dictator, instead of snatching his victuals from

- 5 the table, has been content to have them served to him course by course. [...] I have always held the view that the maintenance of peace depends upon the accumulation of deterrents against the aggressor, coupled with a sincere effort to redress grievances. [...] After the seizure of Austria in March we faced this problem in
- our Debates. I ventured to appeal to the Government to go a little further than the Prime Minister went, and to give a pledge that in conjunction with France and other Powers they would guarantee the security of Czechoslovakia while the Sudeten-Deutsch question was being examined either by a League of Nations Commis-
- 15 sion or some other impartial body, and I still believe that if that Course had been followed events would not have fallen into this disastrous state. [...] All these forces, added to the other deterrents which combinations of Powers, great and small, ready to stand firm upon the front of law and for the ordered remedy of
- grievances, would have formed, might well have been effective. [...] Between submission and immediate war there was this third alternative, which gave a hope not only of peace but of justice. It is quite true that such a policy in order to succeed demanded that Britain should declare straight out and a long time beforehand
- ²⁵ that she would, with others, join to defend Czechoslovakia against an unprovoked aggression. His Majesty's Government refused to give that guarantee when it would have saved the situation, yet in the end they gave it when it was too late, and now, for the future, they renew it when they have not the slightest power to make it
- good. All is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechos-30 lovakia recedes into the darkness....No one has a right to say that the plebiscite which is to be taken in areas under Saar conditions, and the clean-cut of the 50 per cent areas-that those two operations together amount in the slightest degree to a verdict of self-
- ³⁵ determination. It is a fraud and a farce to invoke that name.... We in this country, as in other Liberal and democratic countries, have a perfect right to exalt the principle of self-determination, but it comes ill out of the mouths of those in totalitarian States who deny even the smallest element of toleration to every section and
- ⁴⁰ creed within their bounds. [...] What will be the position, I want to know, of France and England this year and the year afterwards? What will be the position of that Western front of which we are in full authority the guarantors? [...] This is only the beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first sip, the first foretaste of a

supreme recovery of moral health and martial vigour, we arise again and take our stand for freedom as in the olden time. Rede Churchills vor dem britischen Abgeordnetenhaus am 5.10.1938. Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, vol.339 (1938), cols 548-553

Q5

"Building up a lasting peace for Europe"

As regards future policy, it seems to me that there are really only two possible alternatives. One of them is to base yourself upon the view that any sort of friendly relation, or possible relations, shall I say, with totalitarian States are impossible, that the assurances which have been given to me personally are worthless, that they have sinister designs and that they are bent upon the domination of Europe and the gradual destruction of democracies. Of course, on that hypothesis, war has got to come, and that is the view--a perfectly intelligible view - of a certain number of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen in this House....

If that is hon. Members' conviction, there is no future hope for civilisation or for any of the things that make life worth living. Does the experience of the Great War and of the years that followed it give us reasonable hope that if some new war started that would end war any more than the last one did? No. I do not believe that war is inevitable. [...]

What is the alternative to this bleak and barren policy of the inevitability of war? In my view it is that we should seek by all means in our power to avoid war, by analysing possible causes, by trying to remove them, by discussion in a spirit of collaboration and good will. I cannot believe that such a programme would be rejected by the people of this country, even if it does mean the establishment of personal contact with dictators, and of talks man to man on the basis that each, while maintaining his own ideas

- of the internal government of his country, is willing to allow that other systems may suit better other peoples. The party opposite surely have the same idea in mind even if they put it in a different way. They want a world conference. Well, I have had some experiences of conferences, and one thing I do feel certain of is that it better to have no conference at all than a conference which is a failure. [...] I am not saying that a conference would not have its place in due course. But I say it is no use to call a conference of the world, including these totalitarian Powers, until you are sure they
- are going to attend, and not only that they are going to attend, but that they are going to attend with the intention of aiding you in the policy on which you have set your heart. [...] Our policy of appeasement does not mean that we are going to seek new friends at the expense of old ones, or, in-deed, at the expense of any other nations at all. I do not think that at any time there has been a more complete identity of views between the French Government and ourselves than there is at the present time. Their objective is the same as ours - to obtain the collaboration of all nations, not excluding the totalitarian States, in building up a lasting peace for Europe.
- 45 bitter cup which will be proffered to us year by year unless by a 45 [The vote which followed supported the government 369 to 150.] Rede Chamberlains vor dem britischen Abaeordnetenhaus am 5.10.1938. Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, vol.339 (1938), cols 548 - 553

